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Abstract
Alzaid et al. proposed a forward & backward secure key management scheme in wireless sensor
networks for Process Control Systems (PCSs) or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
systems. The scheme, however, is still vulnerable to an attack called the sandwich attack that can be
launched when the adversary captures two sensor nodes at times t1 and t2, and then reveals all the
group keys used between times t1 and t2. In this paper, a fix to the scheme is proposed in order to limit
the vulnerable time duration to an arbitrarily chosen time span while keeping the forward and backward
secrecy of the scheme untouched. Then, the performance analysis for our proposal, Alzaid et al.’s scheme,
and Nilsson et al.’s scheme is given.
Keywords: sandwich attack; wireless sensor network; forward and backward secrecy; key management;
process control systems; supervisory control and data acquisition; node
1 Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have a devastating security threat: node capture [9]. The threat is so pow-
erful that almost all existing key management protocols are helpless because it overthrows the fundamental
assumption for cryptographic system design which long term secret keys are securely stored. This is why
so called forward secrecy and backward secrecy are required in cryptographic key management protocols for
WSNs. Both terminologies, in the current literature, are rather misleading and confusing. Therefore, Alzaid
et al. proposed: future key secrecy and past key secrecy [3].
• Past key secrecy: The past keys should not be compromised even when the current key is compro-
mised.
• Future key secrecy: The future keys should not be compromised even when the current key is
compromised.
Usually WSNs employ two types of key: (1) the group key shared among all the sensor nodes and the
network manager, and (2) the pairwise key shared between each sensor node and the network manager.
Nilsson et al. [15] proposed a key management scheme for WSN applications in PCS/SCADA environments
[4,7,14,16], which was incorrectly claimed to provide future and past key secrecy. Nilsson et al.’s scheme uses
key transport, not key agreement, where the new pairwise key is determined solely by the sensor node. This
has brought a vital flaw to their scheme with regard to node capture attacks. The attacker, after capturing
a node, can choose his own values for future pairwise keys. Some proposals (only for pairwise key update)
provide past key secrecy, but not future key secrecy [12, 13]. Alzaid et al. have recently proposed a key
management scheme for PCS/SCADA environments, which provides both past key secrecy and future key
secrecy [3]. The scheme applied Lamport’s reverse hash chain as well as usual hash chain to provide both
future and past key secrecy. The scheme avoids the delivery of the whole value of a new group key for group
key update; instead only half of the value is transmitted from the network manager to the sensor nodes.
This way, the compromise of a pairwise key alone does not lead to the compromise of the group key, which
was not the case in the scheme proposed by Nilsson et al. However, Alzaid et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to
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a new kind of attack which is called the sandwich attack. This attack can be launched when the adversary
captures two nodes at times t1 and t2, and then reveals all the group keys used between times t1 and t2. We
propose a simple fix to Alzaid et al.’s scheme which does not affect its desirable features and significantly
mitigates the weakness with regard to sandwich attacks.
Table 1: Notations Used in This Paper
M Network manager
N Sensor node
KMN Shared pairwise key between M and N
s0, t0 Pre-installed global secret data in every N
KiG The i-th group key (i ≥ 0)
rX Random nonce chosen by entity X
{m}X Encryption of message m under the key K
h(.) A cryptographic hash function
hK(.) A keyed hash function using the key K
2 Alzaid et al.’s Scheme
In this section, we briefly describe Alzaid et al.’s scheme. Table I shows the notations used throughout their
paper. In order to fight node capture attacks, Alzaid et al.’s scheme implemented a novel key evolution,
which combines a forward hash chain and a reverse hash chain to provide both past key secrecy and future
key secrecy at the same time. The network manager chooses two secret data, s0 and t0. It then prepares two
hash chains of length n: the forward hash chain starts from s0 and ends at h
n−1(s0) by applying the hash
function n − 1 times; the reverse hash chain starts from t and ends at t0 by repeating the hash operation
n− 1 times.
s0, h
1(s0) := h(s0), ..., h
n−1(s0) := h(h
n−2(s0))
t0 := h(h
−1(t0)), h
−1(t0) := h(h
−2(t0)), ..., h
−(n−1)(t0) := t
Note that h−i(t0) means the i-th preimage of t0 in the reverse hash chain, hence t0 = h
n−1(t). Now, the
network manager pre-installs s0 and t0 into the sensor nodes before deployment. When deployed, the sensor
nodes update the group key as shown in Protocol 1.
Protocol 1: The protocol for group key update
1. M → N : i, {h−i(t0)}KMN
2. M ← N : hKMN (K
i
G)
M,N : increment the group key index from i − 1 to i, and update the value of the group key
(KiG := h
i(s0)⊕ h
−i(t0)).
Whenever the protocol is executed, the group key is updated from Ki−1G to K
i
G. The network manager
M releases the i-th preimage encrypted under the pairwise key KMN . The sensor node, upon reception of
the first protocol message, validates the preimage by checking if h(h−i(t0)) = h
−(i−1)(t0), and then hashes
hi−1(s0) to get h
i(s0). Finally, it computes the new group key K
i
G by computing h
i(s0)⊕h
−i(t0). The sensor
node computes the keyed hash of the new group key and returns it to M , and stores hi(s0) and h
−i(t0) for
future use.
By combining two hash chains, the protocol provides a few nice features. First, the presence of the i-th
preimage of t0 in the first message assures the sensor nodes of the message’s authenticity. In other words,
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it assures that the network manager is the only one who generated the message. Moreover, the message is
fresh because the preimage has never been disclosed before.
Second, the protocol provides a sort of self-synchronization to the whole WSN system. Due to lossy
transmission in WSNs, some sensor nodes may fall behind with group key update. The sensor nodes, how-
ever, will soon be able to catch up at the next rekeying: it can compute the correct value of the new group
key simply by checking the difference of two index values - the received and the stored - and applying the
corresponding number of hash operations.
Last, but most importantly, the protocol provides both forward key secrecy and backward key secrecy
against two kinds of compromise: group key compromise and pairwise key compromise. Only with knowledge
of either the group key KiG or the pairwise key KMN alone, the attacker cannot compute the next group
key Ki+1G because it requires knowledge of h
i+1(s0) and h
−(i+1)(t0). Even when a node is captured and
thus revealing all the secret data including hi(s0), h
−i(t0), K
i
G, and KMN , the attacker cannot compute
any past or future group/pairwise keys. In order to get the next group key, the attacker has to wait and
monitor the next protocol run. Once he misses one instance of the protocol run for group key update, and
subsequently if Protocol 2, as shown below, is executed, he loses the control of the sensor nodes entirely with
regard to group keys and pairwise keys. Even if the adversary can seamlessly monitor all the protocol runs
for group/pairwise key update, the attacker cannot get the new group/pairwise keys after the execution of
Protocol 2, especially if he is not able to modify the software embedded in the sensor node such as random
number generators. Protocol 2 is intended to update both pairwise and group keys. Use of Diffie-Hellman
Protocol 2: The protocol for pairwise key update
1. M → N : i, {h−i(t0), g
rM }Ki−1
G
# broadcast message
2. M ← N : {grN }KMN , hKMN (g
rM , grN )
M,N : increment the group key index from i − 1 to i, and update the values of the pairwise key
and the group key (KMN := g
rM rN , KiG := h
i(s0)⊕ h
−i(t0)).
for pairwise key generation provides future/past key secrecy for pairwise keys. Note that the compromise
of all the security data does not lead to compromise of the old/new pairwise keys because of the forward
secrecy enabled by Diffie-Hellman. The only way for the attacker to keep control of the future pairwise keys
is by modifying the software in the sensor node which generates the Diffie-Hellman component. Even in
that case, he cannot predict the future pairwise key because of the key agreement property of Diffie-Hellman
key exchange. Therefore, the adversary must not fail in his attempt to monitor all the group/pairwise key
update protocol executions. Alzaid et al. derived an attacker model, where attackers are divided into four
types according to their abilities to perform: (1) seamless monitoring and (2) software modification [3].
Their scheme provides forward/backward secrecy against all types of attackers except the most powerful one
(called Type IV), which can afford both conditions (1) and (2) above. In fact, Type IV attacker defeats any
countermeasure by cryptography alone. For detailed description of the protocols and their features, we refer
the readers to [3].
3 Sandwich Attack and Countermeasure
As already mentioned in [3], Alzaid et al.’s scheme suffers from a new kind of attack called the sandwich
attack. Two nodes are captured at times ti and tj (ti < tj), respectively, reveals all the group keys used
between times ti and tj . Here i and j are discrete time indices, which are intended to mean the group key
indices as used in Protocols 1 and 2. The attacker captures a sensor node at time ti which then leads into
compromising hi(s0) and h
−i(t0). Thus, he can compute all the subsequent hash images of the forward
hash chain: hi+1(s0), ..., h
j−1(s0), h
j(s0). When he captures another node at time tj , he can compute all the
preimages of the reverse hash chain: h−j(t0), h
−(j−1)(t0), ..., h
−(i+1)(t0). Now the attacker can compute all
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the group keys from ti to tj by the computation: K
k
G := h
k(s0)⊕ h
−k(t0), where ti ≤ tk ≤ tj .
This weakness comes from the design feature of the scheme: the combination of a forward hash chain and
a backward hash chain. Our solution to this problem is simple: Break the reverse hash chain into shorter
ones while not leaving any vulnerable security crack between their connection. The following protocol is a
modified version of Protocol 1 to accommodate this idea.
Protocol 3: The modified version of the group key update protocol in Alzaid et al.’s scheme [3]
1. M → N : i, {h−i(t0), t
′
0 }KMN
2. M ← N : hKMN (K
i
G)
M,N : increment the group key index from i− 1 to i, reset the value of h−i(t0) to t
′
0, and update
the value of the group key (KiG := h
i(s0)⊕ h
−i(t0)).
The protocol messages of Protocol 3 are exactly the same as those of Protocol 1 except for the addition
of a new data t
′
0. This addition enables the network manager M to restart a new reverse hash chain by
choosing a new starting value t
′
, and then computing successive hash images of t
′
. The final value of the
hash chain is assigned to t
′
0. In other words,M reestablishes the reverse hash chain with t
′
as a starting point.
It should be noted that, after the execution of Protocol 3, h−i(t0) is no longer related to t0 and thus
h−(i−1)(t0) as well; in fact, it has been reset to the value of t
′
0, i.e., h
−i(t0) := t
′
0. It is just for notational
convenience that we keep using the name h−i(t0). Inclusion of t
′
0 together with h
−i(t0) in the first message
of Protocol 3 convinces the sensor node that t
′
0 has originated from the network manager. Note that t
′
0 is
delivered to the sensor node encrypted under the pairwise key KMN , not under the group key. And then,
the new group key, which is computed by using the new reverse hash chain, is hashed and then returned to
the network manager. Thus, the network manager can be certain that t
′
0 has successfully installed into the
sensor node.
Interestingly, the modified protocol equipped with the countermeasure comes with a nice feature: reestab-
lishing the reverse hash chain. With this feature, the sensor nodes do not have to be recollected to refill the
reverse hash chain. Now, the network manager can initiate Protocol 3 any time to restart the reverse hash
chain, hence arbitrarily limiting the time span within which sandwich attacks succeed.
In fact, M can play two strategies in order to accomplish the reinitialization of the reverse hash chain.
On one hand, M can replace Protocol 1 completely with Protocol 3. The only drawback with this strategy
is that the self-synchronization feature, as mentioned in the description of Protocol 1, cannot be maintained
anymore. Therefore, M must rerun Protocol 3 until he receives the second message of the protocol from N
to ensure that the reverse hash chain has been reestablished. In return, however, we get a key management
entirely free from sandwich attacks.
On the other hand,M can switch between Protocol 1 and Protocol 3 whenever it is needed. For example,
the network manager can use only Protocol 1 to renew the group key several times based on the same reverse
hash chain. When there is a suspicion that the sandwich attack may occur, M can switch and run Protocol
3 in order to limit the usefulness of the disclosed components of the previous hash chain. After that, M
can switch back to Protocol 1. The choice between these two strategies depends on how much concern the
network designer has with the sandwich attack.
4 Performance Analysis
Due to the resource constraints in WSNs [2], new metrics such as energy efficiency have been introduced
in order to validate the performance of new proposals. In this section, we analyze the performance of our
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Table 2: Memory Overhead Comparison
Stored information per sensor
Nilsson et al. [15] Alzaid et al. [3] Our proposal
Qty Size Qty Size Qty Size
(bits) (bits) (bits)
Pairwise key shared with M
(KMN )
2 256 1 256 1 256
Key used for random num-
ber generation
1 128 - - - -
M
′
s public key 1 256 - - - -
Group key (KG) 1 128 1 128 1 128
Secret data - - 2 128 2 128
Indexes - - 2 16 2 16
Hashed value of the old pair-
wise key
- - 1 128 1 128
proposal, Alzaid et al.’s scheme [3], and the similar scheme proposed by Nilsson et al. [15]. Our performance
analysis covers memory overhead, communication cost, and computation cost for these schemes. To the best
of our knowledge, the performance analysis for these schemes does not exist in the current literature.
4.1 Memory Overhead
In this section, we discuss the amount of memory required by our proposal. Interestingly, it does not need
more memory than what is required by Alzaid et al.’s scheme. This is because each sensor node replaces t0
with t
′
0 when the network manager reestablishes the reverse hash chain as discussed in Section 3. There is
no need to keep copies of both t0 and t
′
0 at the same time, only one of them is needed.
Each sensor node, prior to the deployment phase, stores four pieces of information: the secret data (hi(s0)
and h−i(t0)), two indexes: one for the group key update phase (i) and another one (j) to handle the delivery
failure problems. The delivery failure problem is not discussed in this paper because it was not affected by
the sandwich attacks. However, it is an important part of the proposed protocol.
The sensor node then needs to keep a copy of the recent pairwise key shared with M (which is KMN ),
the group key (which is KG), and a hashed copy of the old pairwise key (which is h
j(KMN ). The reason
for keeping a hashed copy of the old pairwise key is to use it when M runs the delivery failure protocol as
described in Alzaid et al.’s scheme. In other words, a sensor node needs to store two symmetric keys (KMN ,
KG), two secret values (h
i(s0), h
−i(t0)), two indexes (i, j), and a hashed copy of the previous pairwise key.
Consequently, each sensor node, in our proposal and Alzaid et al.’s scheme, needs to store approximately
100 bytes in order to achieve 128 bit security. This memory overhead occupies approximately 0.078% of the
total program flash memory at the most popular sensor end device mica2 [6]. The 100 bytes include two
keys (256 bit and 128 bit long each), two 128 bit secret data, two 16 bit indexes, and one 128 bit hashed
value of the previous pairwise key (see Table II).
On the other hand, Nilsson et al.’s scheme occupies approximately 128 bytes which is equivalent to 0.1%
of the total program memory in order to achieve the same level of security. This memory overhead includes
two 256 bit pairwise keys between M and N (one is the current pairwise key and the other is a copy of the
previous key to handle the key delivery failure), one pre-installed 128 bit secret key that is used to generate
the random number, one 256 bit public key for M , and one 128 bit group key (see Table II).
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4.2 Communication Overhead
The communication between sensor nodes is considered the biggest factor that destroys the sensor’s battery
since it consumes most of the available power. It consumes much more than sensing and computation activ-
ities. Hill et al. concluded that each bit transmitted in WSNs consumes about as much power as executing
800-1000 instructions [11]. The mica2 data sheet declared that the energy consumption of communication,
which is the focus of this section, is unequal for sending and receiving [6]. The energy consumption of
transmitting with maximum power is more than double the energy consumption of receiving activities.
On one hand, the energy consumption for transmitting m bits over a distance r, according to [1,10], can
be calculated as follows:
Etx(m, r)(m, r) = mEc + mer
s ,
where e=
{
e1s = 2, for r < rcr
e2s = 4, for r > rcr
(1)
Here Ec represents the minimum energy required to operate the radio circuit, e denotes the unit energy
required for the transmitter amplifier, and rcr is the crossover distance. The typical values for Ec, e1, and
rcr are 50nJ/bits for a 1 Mbps transceiver, 10 pJ/bitm
2, and 86.2m, respectively.
On the other hand, the energy consumption that is resulted from the receiving activities can also be
calculated as follows:
Erx(m, r) = mEc (2)
Assuming that r = 50 < rcr, Table III lists the number of bits that is required to be transmitted in order
to accomplish the renewal of the pairwise and group keys.
In our proposal, the network manager may need to reset the reverse hash chain in order to defeat the
sandwich attack as in Protocol 3. The repetition of this process depends on the time span, which is defined
by M , within which the adversary is allowed to succeed in launching the sandwich attack. M may reset the
reverse hash chain every time when he updates the group key, or he may reset it after l group key renewals.
It depends totally on the protocol specification.
In comparison with the group key update protocol (Protocol 1) in Alzaid et al.’s scheme, the reestablish-
ment of the reverse hash chain (Protocol 3) requires the sensor node N to receive 128 more bits in the first
message of the protocol (see Table III). The inclusion of the extra 128 bits, which is t
′
0, with h
−i(t0) in the
first message is important to convince the sensor node that the reestablishment of the reverse hash chain is
originated by M as discussed in Section 3. After the success of running Protocol 3, M can run Protocol 2
in order to update the group and pairwise keys at the same time.
The transmission of those extra bits leads to more energy consumption. Table III shows that our proposal
consumes 6.4J more energy than Alzaid et al.’s scheme in order to update the group key. M , in our proposal,
may run Protocol 1 if there is no need to reestablish the reverse hash chain. This means that the increase in
the energy consumption is not continuous, and it exists only when there is a need for the reestablishment.
If there is no need to reset the reverse hash chain, the transmission energy consumption for our proposal is
the same as Alzaid et al.’s scheme.
The network managerM , in our proposal and in Alzaid et al.’s scheme, initiates the pairwise key rekeying
mechanism while the sensor node itself initiates the mechanism in Nilsson et al.’s scheme. Our proposal and
Alzaid et al.’s scheme require M and N to swap the Diffie-Hellman components grM and grN . This increases
the length of the information received by a sensor node by 34 bytes compared to Nilsson et al.’s scheme.
Although this increase affects the energy consumption, it is a must to solve the security weaknesses in Nils-
son et al.’s scheme. We refer interested readers in these weaknesses to [3]. Importantly, this increase in the
number of transmitted bits affects the energy consumption of receiving activities (Erx), but not the energy
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Table 3: Number of Bits Transmitted/Received by A Sensor
Protocol Step
Nilsson et al. [15] Alzaid et al. [3] Our proposal
# of Consumed # of Consumed # of Consumed
bits energy (µJ) bits energy (µJ) bits energy (µJ)
Pairwise Key
1. M → N - - 272 13.6 272 13.6
2. M ← N 256 19.2 256 19.2 256 19.2
Total 256 19.2 528 32.8 528 32.8
Group Key
1. M → N 256 12.8 144 7.2 272 13.6
2. M ← N 128 9.6 128 9.6 128 9.6
Total 384 22.4 272 16.8 400 23.2
consumption of transmitting activities (Etx). Moreover, the pairwise key rekeying mechanism (Protocol 2)
is able to update the pairwise and group keys at the same time, especially if there is no indication for any
node compromise attack. Table III shows that the communication energy consumption (Etx + Etx) that
results from updating these two keys is 32.8J in our proposal and Alzaid et al.’s scheme while it is 41.6J in
Nilsson et al.’s scheme.
As already mentioned, M runs Protocol 2 in order to update the pairwise and group keys in the same
time. However, M sometimes may need to remove specific nodes from a particular group, especially when
they behave maliciously. In this case, M can run Protocol 1, in Alzaid et al.’s scheme, or Protocol 3, in our
proposal. Table III shows that Protocol 3 (Protocol 1) requires sensor nodes in our proposal (in Alzaid et
al.’s scheme) to receive 2 bytes more (14 bytes less) than Nilsson et al.’s scheme in the first message of the
group key update protocol. However, Protocols 3 (Protocol 1) in our proposal (Alzaid et al.’s scheme) sends
the same number of bits as Nilsson et al.’s scheme in the second message of the group key update protocol.
4.3 Computation Cost
We assess, in this section, the energy consumption that results from applying cryptographic operations in
our proposal, and then compare this consumption with those of Alzaid et al.’s and Nilsson et al.’s schemes
as in Table IV.
For concreteness, we assume that RC5 is used for symmetric encryption/decryption activities, SHA− 1
is used for hash operations, and ECDSA is used for public key encryption. We estimate the cost of the
cryptographic operations based on the results from some analysis studies presented in [5, 8, 17,18].
To update the pairwise key, our proposal consumes the same as Alzaid et al.’s scheme since the pairwise
key update protocol in both schemes are the same. However, our proposal and Alzaid et al.’s schemes con-
sume 274µJ more energy in comparison with Nilsson et al.’s scheme.
On the other hand, each sensor node in our proposal consumes 26µJ more energy to update the group
key in comparison with Alzaid et al.’s scheme. In Protocol 3, M encrypts the new seed of the reverse hash
chain with the next preimage of the current reverse hash chain. This encrypted message is longer by 128
bits than the first message of Protocol 1 in Alzaid et al.’s scheme. This means that N in our proposal, upon
receiving this message, needs to decrypt it with a cost of 26µJ more energy than in Alzaid et al.’s scheme.
In other words, this extra energy consumption in Protocol 2 comes as a result of decrypting longer messages.
It is worth mentioning that the 26µJ increase in the computation energy consumption, in comparison with
Alzaid et al.’s scheme, is not continuous. It exists only when there is a need to reset the reverse hash chain.
The repetition of this process depends on the time span, which is defined by M , within which the adversary
is allowed to succeed in launching the sandwich attack. M may reset the reverse hash chain every time when
he updates the group key, or he may reset it after l group key renewals. It depends totally on the protocol
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Table 4: Computation Cost
Protocol Step
Consumed Energy (µJ)
Nilsson Alzaid Our
et al. [15] et al. [3] proposal
Pairwise Key
1. M → N - 304 304
2. Compute the new key 154 52000 52000
3. M ← N 52154 278 278
Total 52308 52582 52582
Group Key
1. M → N 150 278 304
2. Compute the new key - 154 154
2. M ← N 154 154 154
Total 304 586 612
specification.
Interestingly, our proposal and Alzaid et al.’s can update the pairwise and group keys at the same time
by running Protocol 2, especially if there is no need to eliminate some group members from the group. This
can be done by a sensor node with computation cost of 52582µJ . However, Nilsson et al.’s scheme needs
to run both protocols, pairwise key update protocol and group key update protocol, to update pairwise and
group keys with total computation cost of 52612µJ .
5 Conclusion
Alzaid et al.’s key management scheme has nice features: forward and backward secrecy or future/past key
secrecy as called in [3]. Its design idea is the combination of forward and reverse hash chains for key evolu-
tion. The combination, however, has brought a new problem: vulnerability to the sandwich attack which is
a special kind of node capture attack. Another potential issue with the scheme was how to refill the reverse
hash chain.
We take advantage of the message authentication feature of the first message of Protocol 1 of Alzaid
et al.’s scheme to deliver a commitment (t
′
0) from the network manager to the sensor nodes (as shown in
Protocol 3). This commitment data is now used as the starting value for a “new” reverse hash chain. Our
proposal (Protocol 3) does not necessarily replace the original group key update protocol (Protocol 1); Pro-
tocol 3 can be used only when the network manager needs to reinitialize the reverse hash chain and mitigate
the sandwich attacks. Thus, the sandwich attack can only be attempted with a very limited time interval
which corresponds to the lifetime of a particular reverse hash chain. In short, our countermeasure against
sandwich attacks makes Alzaid et al.’s scheme more resilient against node capture attacks and supports
reinitialization of the reverse hash chain at the same time.
In an application environment where the prevention of the sandwich attack, not just a mitigation of the
attack, is strictly needed, our proposal provides the solution. It replaces Alzaid et al.’s original protocol
(Protocol 1) with Protocol 3 in our proposal. The only drawback of this solution is the self-synchronization
property, as mentioned in the description of Protocol 1 in Section II, is not maintained anymore.
Our performance analysis shows that the sensor node in our proposal consumes approximately 52614.8µJ
and 635.2µJ in order to update the pairwise key and the group key, respectively. This energy consumption
includes the communication cost and the computation cost as listed in Tables III and IV. Our proposal’s
energy consumption for the pairwise key update is the same as Alzaid et al.’s scheme, but it is 287.6µJ
more than Nilsson et al.’s scheme. This difference is due to the security enhancements that are required
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to overcome the weaknesses in Nilsson et al.’s scheme as discussed in Section II. To update the group key,
our proposal consumes 32.4µJ and 308.8µJ more energy than Alzaid et al.’s and Nilsson et al.’s schemes,
respectively. This additional cost is for defeating the sandwich attack and overcoming the weaknesses of
Nilsson et al.’s scheme.
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